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Choe shows producers' stockholding and hedg-  expected available supplies, if output and price
ing decisions as a precautionary behavior against  risks are negatively correlated. And they should
output and price risks. The traditional view is  short-hedge more than the expected available
that producer stocks are held for their conven-  supplies, if those risks are positively correlated.
ience yield. Choe's approach explains recent  When the futures price deviates from the ex-
just-in-time inventory management and allows  pected spot price (futures price bias), speculative
unified treatment of thz precautionary and  trading dominates producers' futures positions.
speculative demands for stocks and the use of  The demand for futures is highly sensitive to the
futures contracts.  futures price bias, while the demand for stocks is
not.
Choe also assumes a more sensible prefer-
ence function so that demand functions for  *  It is well-known that commodity-exporting
stocks and futures are nonlinear. Stocking and  developing countries face great price risk and-
hedging decisions, which are interdependent, are  particularly with agricultural commodities-
solved simultaneously. As a result of these  uncertain output as well. The optimal stocking
refinements, the optimal decision rules are  and hedging rules Choe derives could have
significantly different.  practical applications for these countries.
Several useful results emerge from Choe's  Earlier analyses that considered only the
analysis:  hedging problem typically suggest relatively low
optimal hedge ratios (the proportion of expected
e  When both output and price risks exist,  available supplies that is short-hedged); this ratio
stocks and futures can be combined to reduce the  was also insensitive to expected availab:e
overall exposure to risks (measured by the  supplies and to the degree of risk aversion.
precautionary premium or units of output the
producer is willing to pay for eliminating risks).  The optimal decision rules Choe derives
suggest that the optimal hedge ratio is likely to
In an unbiased futures market (futures price  be much higher than ratios given in earlier
equals expected spot price at the maturity of the  studies. It depends on initial endowments, output
futures contract), commodity producers shouid  and price expectations, and the degree of abso-
short-hedge (sell futures contracts) less than the  lute risk aversion.
|ThePolicy ResearchWorking PaperSeriesdisseminates  thefmdings of work under way in theBank. Anobjectiveof  the series
is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations  are less than fully polished. The findings, interpretations, and
conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy.
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References  37TEE  PRECAUTIONARY  DEMAND FOR  COMMODITY STOCKS
I. Introduction
This paper develops a theory of the precautionary demand for commodity
stocks. It posits that commodity stocks are held for precautionary purposes by
producers, consumers, and intermediate  processors, while speculators hold stocks
on the expectation of capital gains from a subsequent price rise. Producer and
consumar stocks usually account for the largest share of commercial stocks'  held
at any point in time. For example, at the end of 1990, stocks  held by producers
and consumers of copper were 72 percent of all commercial stocks of the market
economy countries. Yet, the  theory explaining the behavior  of this class of
stocks has not progressed much beyond the concept of convenience yield,  first
introduced by Kaldor (1939). This paper proposes an alternative theory. Holding
of  stocks by producers arnd  consumers is  viewed as precautionary behavior towards
output and price risks. As a  theory of behavior towards risks, the precautionary
stock  demand  model  encompasses  speculative  demand  by  both  producers  and
consumers. Furthermore, both  stocks and futures are treated as precautionary
instruments, in contrast to the dichotomy that only stocks provide convenience
yield while futures are hedging instruments.
Convenience yield  has long  been the standard  explanation for  positive stock
holding by producers and consumers when prices are expected to fall. It has been
broadly construed that stocks  provide a service  by just being there and  therefore
command a premium over their market value. The precise meaning of the concept,
however, has not been made clear. According to Kaldor, "the yield of stocks of
raw materials  ...  consists of  'convenience', the possibility of making use of
them  the  moment  they  are wanted."  Working  (1948, 1949) and  Telser  (1958)
1  Stocks  held  by  governments  (such as  U.S.  strategic  stockpiles)  or
international organizations  (such as the buffer  stocks of  the  International
Rubber Organization) are considered as noncommercial stocks.
-1-advanced the view that the  mere presence of  adequate stocks could lower the costs
of producing  a given level of output. Telser further suggested that "holdinq
stocks permits the rate of production or sales to be varied  at lower cost than
would be incurred if the firm attempted to purchase stocks an they were needed."
On the other hand, Brennan  (1958)  and Cootner  (1967) emphasized the marketing
aspect; that  larger stocks allow flexibility  in  adapting  to changing market
conditions and hence  could result in greater revenue. The Working and Telser
interpretation applies to stocks of inputs while that of Brennan and Cootner
relates to stocks of outputs. Regardless, they share the view that stocks  impart
a service by just being there, and this service commands a premium.
The convenience  yield  theory has not advanced much  beyond  conjecture.
Convenience yield has  been presumed to be an  increasing function of  stock levels,
with  the  marginal  yield  diminishing  rapidly  as  the  stock  level  increases.
However, there has not been any attempt to offer a microeconomic  foundation to
the theory. As a result, it has not been clear what factors might determine the
shape of the yield curve, nor in  what units it  might be measured. Further, should
the yield vary between commodities and over time?
Newbery and Stiglitz (1981,  p. 196) attempted to define convenience yield
in terms of risk behavior,  in essence, as the amount a risk-averse  agent is
willing to pay for  the marginal unit of stock in excess of that of a risk-neutral
agent. According to this definition, convenience yield can  be either positive or
negative, depending on the sign of the covariance between price and marginal
utility.  However,  negative  convenience  yield  runs  counter  to  the  concept
espoused by earlier writers and also cannot explain stockholding  at times of
expected price declines.
In this  paper,  we  begin  by positing  that  producers  hold  stocks  as  a
precaution  against unexpected  variations in the output of the commodity. The
greater the quantity  of stocks agents hold, the more  secure they feel about
-2-future uncertainty  and the less willing  they are to pay for the risk. The
reduction  in  the precautionary  premium  due  to an additional  unit  of stocks  (the
marginal precautionary  premium) is expected  to decline as the stock level
increases,  in  much  the  same  way as  the  marginal  convenience  yield  does.  Both  the
marginal  precautionary  premium  and  the  marginal  convenience  yield  should  approach
zero  as stocks  increase  to a sufficiently  high level.
However,  the  recent  advent  of just-in-tim2  inventory  management  practices
suggests  that  as  long  as  supplies  are  available  with  little  chance  of  disruption,
there  is no need  to keep a  substantial  quantity  of stocks.  The increased  use  of
this  practice  suggests  that  stocks  in  and  of  themselves  do not  render  productive
services  or cost savings  as presumed  by the convenience  yield  theorists  --  at
least  not  large  enough  to  cover  the  costs  of  stock  carryover.  Stocks  can  be  pared
down to the bare minimum if the possibility  of disruptions  to the smooth
operation  of the  firm  can  be essentially  eliminated.  The  implication  to be  drawn
from  this example is that precautionary  demand  theory  is likely  to have more
explanatory  power  for  real  world  data  than  the convenience  yield  theory.
The precautionary  stock demand  model is a two-period  expected  utility
maximization  model  under  stochastic  output  and  prices,  with or  without  futures
trading.  The  non-negativity  constraint  on  stocks  and  the  concavity  of  the  utility
function  imply  a convex  demand  function  for  stocks,  very  much in line  with  what
the  proponents  of convenience  yield  had in  mind.
The  model  has  rich policy implications  for the  commodity-exporting
developing  countries  in answering  questions  such  as the following:  What is  the
optimal level  of physical  stocks  these countries  should  hold and how is this
affected  by expectations  and  risk  factors?  To  what  extent  should  these  countries
hedge  their  future  output  and  stocks  using  futures  contracts?  Explicit  algebraic
solutions  to these questions  are provided;  such solutions  are not elsewhere
available  in the literature.
-3-The  theory  also  has  implications  for  commodity  price  determination,
including the relationship between expected spot and futures prices. Physical
stocks provide  the  linkage between  the current  and  expected  spot prices  of
commodities, while the futures  market determines  the relationship  between futures
and expected  spot prices.  The model  solutions  suggest that  normally  futures
markets  will  be  biased  when  both  output  and  price  risks  are  present.  The
direction of the bias, however. is not certain; the precautionary stock demand
theory does  not necessarily  support the theory of normal  backwardation  (the
phenomenon that futures prices tend to be lower than the expected spot price)
despite the presence of a positive precautionary premium.
This paper is divided into five sections. The next section considers the
stockholding problem  of a competitive producer  that  faces only output  risk.
Section III extends the analysis to the case where agents face both output and
price  risks.  Section  IV  introduces  the  possibility  of  trading  in  futures
contracts as well as in physical stocks. The last section concludes the paper.
IY.  Competitive Producer with Output Risk
Consider the case  of a competitive commodity producer who has to decide how
much  of  current  output  to  carry  over  to  the  next  period.  The  decision  is
complicated by the fact that the producer's expected output in the next period
is subject to random variation. The uncertainty of output is  particularly great
for agricultural commodities, but the problem exists for  most other products in
one degree or other. For the sake of simplicity, we assume in this section that
the producer knows with certainty the next-period spot price of the commodity.
The competitiveness assumption allows us to derive the producer's storage rule
taking prices as given.
Output uncertainty is assumed to arise from  purely random factors, such as
-4-weather and accidents. It raises problems for producers in at least two ways.
First, given the price output volatility  implies revenue volatility. A large
revenue shortfall, if unprepared for, can neceesitate a producer having to make
costly adjustments to planned operations. Second, the producer has to cope with
the inability to satisfy customer demands or  meet other contractual obligations.
Possible consequ .ices  of failing to meet these demands  include damage to the
firm's reputation  as a reliable supplier; alternatively, the cost of quickly
finding substitutes could be high. One way of dealing with a potential output
shortfall is  to maintain a cushion  of physical stocks.  This  is  an age-old method.
Grains have been routinely stored as a precaution against bad harvests (an old
example is the story of Joseph in  Egypt). A more recent example is  the strategic
stockpiling  of petroleum  in the wake  of the oil  price shocks.  The critical
question  in all of these cases is what should be the optimal  level of  such
stocks.
Consider a  producer that operates for only  two periods, the current period
(period 0) and the next period (period 1).  At the end of the current period, the
producer  knows the quantity  produced during that period,  Q., and  the stocks
carried over from the preceding period, I0. Let AO  =  QO  + XO,  the total amount of
the commodity available to the producer at  the end of the current period. Before
the beginning of the next period, the producer has to decide how much of AO  to
sell and how much to carry over to the next period.  If the producer sells SO,
then stocks carried over to period 1 are It  =  AO - SO.  The  equality implies that
commodities always have a positive value and therefore are not wasted.
As of period 0, the producer's output in period 1 is an unknown quantity,
5,  where the tilde indicates that it is a random variable. We assume that
+  =  ,  E(0) =  0,  E(0 2) = n.  E(.) is  the expectation operator. In  period 1,
the firm will have at its disposal the realized output during that period, plus
stocks carried over from the previous period, minus storage costs and wastage.
Thus,  Li,  +  aIl,  0<6<1, where 1-6 is  the proportion lost due to wastage and
-5-storage costs. Because of the two-period  construction,  we  assume that the
producer  sells the entire  quantity  of commodities  at hand before  the end of
period 1; i.e.,  SI  =  Al. 2
The producer's  revenue  in each  period  is equal  to the quantity  of sales
times  the price.  We assume  that  the producer  consumes  all  his revenues  in  each
period.  Let  CO  and  Cl  denote  the  producer's  consumption  in  the  respective  periods.
Then,
Co  =  PoSo  = Po (AO  -11)
el  =  Pig,  =  P1 .( 1+6I 1 )  (
The  producer  chooses  the  level  of II  so as to maximize
Max  J  = U(Co)  + PEo V(( 1),  O<P<l,
8.t.  (1),  O0I 1sAO,  (2)
2S,  00,  Q03,  Po, P 1 given.
U and V are period 0 and period 1 utility functions, respectively. Eo denotes
expectation  based  on information  available  in  period  0, and P  is the  time rate
of discount. The utility functions are assumed to be continuously differentiable
and are strictly concave; i.e., U',V'>O;  U/ 1,V11<O;  U"/',V"'1>O.  It is assumed that
the producer can neither borrow nor lend physical stocks.
2  If the producer remains in business after period 1, it would be necessary
to  allow  for  stock carryover  to period  2.  This  essentially  calls  for an
extension to the  multi-period case. Such  an extension, however, has been feasible
only for a restricted class of utility functions that  imply undesirable risk
behavior.  Kimball  (1990b) has shown  that  solutions  of  a two-period  optimal
savings  model closely  mimic those  of its  multi-period counterpart. The two-period
moCel examined in this paper can also be viewed as the optimization problem of
the  final  two  periods  of  a  finite-horizon  multi-period  model.  In  fact,  a
numerical solution of  the multi-period problem can be obtained by using the two-
period stocking rule backwards iteratively, starting from the terminal year.
-6-Differentiating (2)  with respect to II  and setting the result equal to zero
yields the first order condition for the maximum:
POUI  (CO)  28  8PI  Eo  VI  (01)  (3)
=  If  O<1 1<Ao 0
where AO  is assumed to be a positive number. When an interior soluticn obtA4n1s,
the marginal utility of consumption in the current period equals the expected
marginal utility of consumption in the next period discounted by the discount
factor, storage cost, and price differential.
When the expected next-period output is sufficiently large compared with
the current availability,  it is possible to have a corner solution at I-O.
Actually, the producer may wish to carry negative physical stocks, if possible.
Thus,  at  I=O,  the non-negativity  constraint would  have  a positive  shadow
price, equivalent to the net gain in utility by increasing current consumption
beyond  A0  (by borrowing  from next-period  output). The  other possible  corner
solution is  11=AO,  but this can be shown  to be suboptimal. Under the assumption
that U(.)=V(.), if Il=A,,  then,
J IX.-A  = U(O)+PEOV(2 1+8A O)
U (AO) +PE 0V(01)  =  J+Ao
Thus,  under the circumstances postulated,  Il=Ao  is  suboptimal and  therefore will
not be attained.
-7-A. Precautionary  Premium
To  focus  on  the  producer'I  behavior  towards  risk, !.t  is  useful  to introduce
the  concept  of precautionary  premium.  The  concept  also  helps  us  solve  che
stochastic  equation  in (3).  Write  out  the  expectations  term  of (3)  and  postulate
that  there  is  a  premium,  ir,  in  units  of next-period  output,  that  the  producer  is
willing  to pay to remove  the output  uncertainty;  i.e.,
V1[P 1(Q 1-I+81 1)J  E0 V1[F 1(Q 1. .8I)  (4)
In the  terminology  of Kimball  (1990),  it  is called  the equivalent  precautionary
premium,  in  the sense  that  the certainty  equivalent  of  J  is  Qi-s .
The above  definition  of precautionary  premium is a direct  extension  of
Arrow  and  Pratt's  equivalent  risk  premium.  An  approximate  expression  for  it  can
be found  in  much  the  same  way  Pratt  (1964)  used  to  derive  an  approximate  formula
for  equivalent  risk  premium.  Applying  Taylor  series  expansion  on both sides  of
(4)  and rearranging  terms  yields
-9  (Pi*Q,  I,Xi, Oe)  -2°  j  o  ,t5
where  C=(Q>8I 1 )P 1. Note that  w>0  as long  as  V is strictly  concave.
The  precautionary  premium measures the  sensitivity  of  the  decision
variab's,  Il,  to risk, wher.as  the risk premium  measures  the degree  of risk
aversion.  Kimball  defines -Vm/VV"  as the  index  of  absolute  prudence,  a  measure
of  precautionary  motive,  in  much  the  same  way  Arrow-Pratt  defined  -V"/V'  as  the
index  of  absolute  risk  aversion.  The  higher  the  absolute  prudence,  the  hicher  the
precautionary  premium, and the higher the precautionary  demand for stocks.
-8-Kimball  shows  that  -V'II/Vlk  -VI/  V,  if the  index of  absolute  risk  aversion
declines as income increases. Thus, under the declining absolute risk aversion
utility function, considered by  many as more realistic than the case of  constant
absolute risk  aversion, absolute  prudence is  greater than  absolute risk aversion.
Therefore, the precautionary motive to hold stocks could be quite strong.
Convenience  yield represents  cost savings or revenue gains  due to the
(intangible) services provided by stocks. As such, it is conceptually different
from  the precautionary premium which specifically limits the service provided by
stocks to risk reduction. Since stockholding is a  precautionary behavior toward
risk, a risk-neutral agent will not hold precautionary stocks, nor will a risk-
averse  agent when  there  is no risk. 3 The  convenience  yield  theory  predicts
stockholding in both situations. Convenience yield is a function of the current
stock level while the precautionary premium is a function of the next-period
output and price variability. As a result, the precautionary stock demand model
has richer dynamic implications than the convenience yield model.
B.  Solution  with  the  Constant  Relative  Risk  Aversion  Utility  Function
Substituting  (4) into (3), the first-order condition becomes
3  Newbery and Stiglitz  (1981, p.196) show that a risk-neutral agent will
hold stocks under output  and price risks if
P=EV/
is  positive.  They  define  4  as  the  measure  of  convenience  yield.  However,
according to this definition, a risk-neutral agent  will not hold stocks if there
is only output risk and no price risk, because 4  becomes zero. Clearly, this
definition  is not general enough to make convenience yield a theory of stock
holding under uncertainty.
-9-Po U'EPO(AO-II.)]  P8  P 1 V'[P 1(U 1+8x 1,-n)  (6)
From here on, we ignore the fact that  r  will be approximated by (5). Note that
(6)  is a deterministic equation; the  use of the precautionary premium allowed us
to convert a stochastic equation into  a deterministic cne. This is, in fact, the
standard method of solving stochastic dynamic optimization problems.
Equation  (6) can be solved for Is  under  specific assumptions  about the
utility function. In this and subsequent sections we assume that the relevant
utility function exhibits constant  relative risk aversion (CRRA),  which takes  the
form:
U(C)  =C  -o<)-l.  (7)
The index of relative risk aversion is given by  -CU"/U'=A, which is constant.
The  index  of relative prudence is  given by  -CU'/U"=1+1,  which is also constant
and greater than relative risk aversion. If 1=0, CRRA degenerates into a linear
function, implying risk neutrality. If  A=1, CRRA becomes the logarithmic utility
function that  exhibits  unitary  relative risk  aversion.  If  A<0, the  utility
function becomes convex, implying  that the agent is a risk lover.  Henceforth, we
limit  our analysis to the risk-averse case, O0<l<. Within this range, the higher
the value of 1, the greater the degree of risk aversion and prudence. With CRRA,
the  indexes of  absolute risk aversion  (1/C) and absolute  prudence  ([l+;A]/C)
decline as consumption increases.
Two  other  important  classes  of  utility  functions  widely  used  in the
literature are the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function and
the quadratic utility function.  Most previous studies have used the CARA because
it lends  itself to mean-variance analysis  and hence  to explicit solutions for  the
-10-demands for stocks and futures. However, because of the constant absolute risk
aversion assumption, the resulting demand equations are linear in prices (see,
for example, Newbery and Stiglitz). In the following sections, it will be seen
that, with CRRA, demand equations are nonlinear in prices, which is intuitively
more appealing than the linear  version. The quadratic utility function is ruled
out because it implies zero  precautionary premium and  therefore is  unsuitable for
modeling precautionary behavior.
For the  sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, assume that U
and V are both CRRA utility functions with the same A. The precautionary premium
in this case is approximated by
(1+A) o2  (8)
2 (0  +6I,)
Given  the index  of absolute prudence, the precautionary premium is  an increasing
function of the variance  of output and a declining  function of the expected
output in the next period and stock carryover.
In  the case of CRRA,  the first-order condition (6)  for an interior solution
is
Po1PO(AO-1 1)  1 ] - 6P 1 E[P 1 (Q, .8I 1 -n)  -A.  (9)
Substitute (8) into (9) and rearrange the terms to get a quadratic equation in
XI,  which has the following two real solutions:
-11-I 8Ao-(1+2y8)  Qli,*r  (10)
where
(  aY  W( PO
q=  (Q 1 +8AO)
2 +25y(1+8y)  (l+)q2.
Non-negativity of Il  requires that if  a negative solution is  obtained, then XI=0.
This constitutes a corner solution. Of the two solutions above, the one with the
negative square root term produces a negative solution for IX  for a wide range
of reasonable values of variables and parameters. The other solution with the
positive  square root term mostly produces a positive solution but a negative
solution  is  also  possible  for  some  extreme  values  of  the  variables  and
parameters. When two solutions of  (10) are put together, the optimal solution
will consist of a segment where XI=0 (corner solution) and a segment where XI>0
(interior solution). Henceforth, we focus on the interior solution.
A sufficient condition for obtaining an interior solution from  (10) is
A&>P30.  That is, producers will not carry stocks to the next period  if the
expected next-period output is sufficiently larger  than the currently available
supplies.
C.  Sensitivities
What  is the effect of output uncertainty  on stockholding behavior?  To
answer this question, suppose that the producer has perfect foresight regarding
next-period output. For such an agent,  ae=O  in equation (10)  and it simplifies
to
-12-IPf  A=- 1 Y.  (11) l+Y6
where the superscript (pf)  denotes the case of perfect foresight. Stock holding
in this case is for the purpose of optimally allocating consumption over time in
a certain world. The condition for zero stock carryover in a certain world is
AO=yQ 1,  or
PI  = ( Ao)
If  Ab=Q 1 and the agent is risk neutral, then the above becomes
pi =  (6)'.  (12)
Equation  (12) is the  intertemporal arbitrage  condition  for speculators  in a
certain world.
It  can  be easily verlfied  that  4-I  =,q-  (Q1+8A 0 ) >0.  That is,  the producer
holds more stocks under output uncertainty than under output certainty. We call
II-I°t  the  precautionary  stockholding,  the  size  of  which  depends  on
28y(1.Oy)  (1.)a8.  Note that  this term contains the numerator of  the expression
for the precautionary  premium in  (8). Thus, the larger  ae,  the  larger the
precautionary  premium  and  the  larger  the  precautionary  stock  demand.  This
confirms  the  earlier  statement that  the  precautionary  premium  measures  the
sensitivity of stockholding to output risk.
The relationship between optimal Il  and AO  implied by a complete model of
a commodity market is  known as the competitive storage equation, and  has  been the
-13-subject of investigation by Gustafson  (1958), Deaton and Laroque  (1990), and
Williams and Wright (1991), among others. The precautionary stock demand model
in (10)  represents a competitive storage equation if  prices in  the equation clear
the market. An important feature of the equation is that it is nonlinear in AO.
To see this more clearly, differentiate (10) twice with respect to AO  to get
MPS  - a-  1+(Q1+8A 0)q2  >  o
TA 0 2(1+y6)
1  ~~~~~~~~~~~(13)
a2  l  8q  2[1-(01+8AO)2q-1> >  0,
2  (1+yb)
where the first partial derivative is recognized as the marginal propensity to
store (MPS).  MPS is positive and increasing as a function of AO,  confirming the
nonlinearity.
An interesting question is how MPS changes in  response to output risk. To
find out, differentiate MPS with respect to  O,
_  _  _  _  _  - 3  0
aay(14A)  (Q1 +8A0)  q  2  <  ot  (14)
where  the  negative  value  results  from  the declining  absolute  risk  aversion
property of CRRA. There are two different ways of interpreting (13). First, it
says  that MPS will be lower  the higher the output risk. Second,  the producer will
be less sensitive to output risk the greater the initial endowment (or  wealth).
The second interpretation is intuitively easier to understand than the first,
although the two are equivalent.
Analytic expressions for the sensitivity of stockholding with respect to
the other variables and parameters are not simple enough to reveal their signs.
-14-Partial derivatives of  (10) with respect to  Q 1 8,  5,P 1 ,  for example, can be
easily derived but their signs are not immediately clear. However, it should be
expected that an increase in  Q 1 will reduce stock  demand, while an increase in
P 1 (a decrease  in y) will  increase it. The  higher the  cost of storage  (the
smaller the 6) or the higher the time rate of discount (the smaller the 0),  the
lower the demand  for stocks. These  expectations  can be easily  confirmed  by
numerical simuiation for the appropriate range of values.
III. Competitive Producer under Output and Price Risks
In reality,  producers usually have to deal with both  output and price
risks. When this is  the case, the problem is  complicated by the fact that the act
of stock carryover in effect removes commodities from sale at a certain price in
the current period for sale at an uncertain price in the next period. Stocks,
therefore, increase exposure to the price risk, while reducing exposure to the
output risk. The problem is to find the optimal combination of the two. For the
moment, we  ignore the possibility  of hedging the price  risk through  futures
trading.
Since Muth  (1961),  the competitive storage literature has focused on the
speculative  demand for  stocks under  price uncertainty. Little has  been done about
optimal  stockholding  under  output  and  price  risks, with  or without  futures
trading. In this and the next section, we derive the optimal stockholding and
hedging rules for risk-averse producers.
A. The Precautionary Premium and the Optimal Stocking Rule
For a price-taking competitive producer, the market price of a commodity
may be taken as a random variable independent of his own sales or stock-holding
-15-decisions.  We assume  that  ,  Pt+E,  where  E(E 1)  P  (,E)  E(g2)02.  We  do,
however,  allow  for certain  covariance  between  output  and price  disturbances;
i.e.,  E(M§)-paOaG,.  I
With output  and  price  risks,  the next-period  consumption  is expressed  as
A  4  PA  = A.O:l+8xd)
while  the  current-period  consumption  remains  the  same  as in (1).  The  two-period
optimization  problem  in this case  can be stated  exactly  as in  (2).  The  first-
order  condition  for  the  optimum  is
Po  UJ(CO)  k P8  E 0 PIV'(4),
=  if  I4'O.
When  both  price  and  output  risks  are  present,  the  equivalent  precautionary
premium  is  defined  as  the  payment  in  units  of  output  the  agent  is  willing  to  make
for  having  both  0 and I  eliminated  from  (15).  Let  u  represent  the  equivalent
precautionary  premium  defined  by
PlV[plQl-++dl)]  E  B  (Fj-9)VI[(T,+I)(Q$+I)  (16)
where  the supercript  (*)  stands  for  the  case  when output  and  price  risks  exist.
In  order  to  derive  the  approximate  expression  for  ',  apply  the  Taylor-series
'  Even  under  competitive  conditions,  a  producer's  output  level  could  show
non-zero  correlation  with market prices if the random disturbance  on output
applies  to a large segment  of producers;  bad weather is a good example.  An
extension  of the model to the case where the market price depends on the
producer's  sales decision  or actual output level in the second  period will
complicate  the algebra  but  not  the substantive  part  of the  analysis.
-16-expansion  on both sides  of (16)  around  n*=O,  0=0,  1=0  to get
TIV07  [P(l8I  S)  X F3'V/(ZF3)  =V/(,)
EO(P7§3.fV/E(F1+1)  (5.+0+8Xj)] 
+-  (52)P1V  (cE)  o(DE)  [2(V  'I)  ]
2(  12) 12V///(E  +  E  (12)  (Qi+8X1 )  [V'1 (ClV+l(C 1)  ]
and solve  for  n*
-(2p:.aca,  C 1 - P*ea,QcF  +  a!P 1 V' 1 1 +  (C)  (17)
1P  P  P1 2 P  2  V"(C 1)
where  4F=  (QF8+8IZ).  The precautionary  premium  for  output  and  price risks  is
larger  (smaller)  than  the  sum  of  precautionary  premia  for  output  and  price  risks
separately,  if the  covariance  between output and price risks is positive
(negative).
To  derive  a  closed-form  solution  for  the  optimal  stocking  rule,  we assume
a CRRA utility  function.  Using  -CZ 1 11/V'=1+1  in (18), n*  for  CRRA is
pa0a8(l_A) o2(:_X)C 1 oa2(I+X)  (18)
Pi  2P￿  2 C,
The  optimal  solution  for  X 1 can  be  obtained  from  substitution  of (18)  into  (16),
and  the  resulting  expression  into  (15).  The  result  is  again  a  quadratic  equation
in XI,  which  has  two real  solutions
-17-1  8AO.(1+2ay  *)Q±b-:  8*TI  (19)
28  (1ay'8)




a  =1+  2
b  p,a(1+1),
2
By the same logic as in the case of equation  (10), the optimal interior
solution is likely to be given by the solution with a positive sign for the
square root term in ( 1 9 ).5  Note that if only the  output risk is present,  (19)
collapses to (10).
B.  Speculative  Demand  for  Stocks
When both price and output are  uncertain, the producer's demand for stocks
consists of two components: the precautionary part and the speculative part. If
the price is expected to rise, stocks  provide the  opportunity for  profits as  well
as insurance against an output shortfall. In this case, both speculative and
precautionary demands will be positive. If the price is expected to decline, the
speculative demand will  be negative while the precautionary demand will still be
S  This  statement requires the assum.ption  that 0<1<1, a>0 and b>O. This
shows it is unlikely that we can obtain a positive solution for I,  with  -
in (19).
-18-positive. To what extent will the speculative behavior affect the precautionary
demand?
The  terms  in  (19) do not  easily separate  into the two  components.  To
measure each component, assume that the producer faces only the price risk and
that the output level is known with certainty. Output certainty Implies aO=O
and, hence, b=c=0.  Then, (19) reduces to
IpXrAO-aY'Q 1 (20)
1+ay'8
where  the  superscript  (pr)  denotes  the  case  of  price  risk  only.  Subtract  (20)
from (19) to get
=I-IIpr=  -(I+j8A,+by5)  +~q
1  11  ~~~2  8(I+ay'8)
where the superscript (pc)  denotes the  precautionary component against the  output
risk.
Not all of  IPr is the speculative component of the stock demand because
the agent would hold some stocks even at zero expected profits. To separate the
speculative component from (20),  suppose  the arbitrage  condition (12)  holds  under
perfect foresight. Then, (20) reduces to
,I,=  Ao-  (pa); Q15  (21)
where  the  superscript  (ia) denotes  stock  demand  purely  for the  purpose  of
intertemporal  allocation  of  consumption.  Stock  demand  represented  by  (21)
-19-contains  zero  speculative  element.  Define
(.Q 1+8A 0 ) [  (P8)  -- ay*](2
Is  - IX -1  =  (l+ay8)(1;-1)  (22)
as  the  speculative  component  (ap)  of  the  stock  demand.  Note  that  the speculative
demand  will  be  positive,  negative,  or  equal  to zero  depending  on  whether (8)  -1
is greater  than,  smaller  than,  or equal  to  ay'.  The intertemporal  arbitrage
condition  under  price  uncertainty  is  given  by  the  zero  speculative  demand
condition,  (P8) 1I=ay t,  which  can  be rewritten  as
08)  =(  -1[1  %-)  62].  (23)
One can immediately  note that the term in the square bracket above
represents  the precautionary  premium for price risk. Speculative  demand for
stocks  will  be positive  onll If the  expected  next-period  price  is greater  than
the  current  spot  price  by  a sufficient  margin  to cover  the  precautionary  premium
for  the  price  risk,  in  addition  to  the  cost  of storage  and  time  rate  of  discount.
Collecting  the components  of the stock  demand,  we have
Note that total stock  demand  has to be non-negative,  but not all individual
components  need to be positive.
-20-C.  Effects of Price  Risk
What impact will price uncertainty have on stock demand?  Will agents hold
more  or  less  stocks  under  price  and  output  uncertainty  than  under  output
uncertainty alone? To answer these questions, one can compare (10) and (19) or
differentiate  (19) with respect to  6,-  Neither exercise, however, reveals a
clear answer a priori. Under price risk, stocks reduce exposure to the output
risk at the cost of increasing exposure to the price risk. Therefore, it could
be expected that the presence of price risk generally will dampen the demand for
stocks.  However,  the  issue  is  more  complicated  than  that  because  of  the
correlation between price and output risks.
To  find  the  impact  of  price  risk,  we  use  the  numerical  method  with
plausible ranges of  values for  the  parameters and initial  conditions in  equations
(10)  and (19).  Figure 1  shows the difference in stock  demand,  IX-XI  for a range
of price  variability.  It turns  out that  if the price  and output  risks are
positively correlated, the additional price risk reduces the demand for stocks.
If the two are negatively correlated, the demand for stocks first increases as
the coefficient of variation of price risk increases and then declines after a
certain point. This is because an increase in price risk increases the overall
level of risk exposure if price and output risks are positively correlated, but
if the two are negatively correlated there is a high enough price risk at which
the overall level of risk exposure is smaller than at a low price risk.
As in the previous section, define  MPS  by
PS  =  l  +[Q 1+8(Ao 0 by)]/./.  (24)
m  aA  2(1+ayO)
A  sufficient condition  for a positive MPS is  A 0>by*,  which will  hold for a
reasonable level of  au  or if p<O. Thus, under both output and price risks, the
-21-Figure  1: Effect  of Price  Risk on Storage
8  ~~~~~~~~/
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competitive  storage  equation  retains  the positive  slope for most situations.
Differentiating  (24)  again  with respect  to  A.  yields  an  expression  similar  to
(13),  which  can  be shown  to be positive.  Thus,  the nonlinearity  of MPS is also
maintained  under  output  and  price  risks.
To find  the  effect  of  the  price  risk  on  MPS,  one  can  compare  (13)  and (24)
or  differentiate  (24)  with  respect  to  6,. Neither,  however,  reveals  the  impact
unequivocally.  Again,  numerical  calculations  show  that,  for  all  possible  ranges
of  values for parameters and variables,  MPS  declines as  6,  increases,
regardless  of the value  of p.
-22-IV. Precautionary Stock Demand under Futures Trading
Since futures contracts are available for a wide range of commcdities, it
is important to investigate how  precautionary behavior adapts to futures trading
opportunities. Futures contracts allow agents to lock in the next-period price
in the current period, thus eliminating the price risk. Implications of futures
trading  for commodity  production  and storage, and for market  equilibrium  in
general, have long been the subject of investigation. Past research has focused
on the effects of futures trading on production, market efficiency under futures
trading, and the use of futures for risk reduction and revenue stabilization. In
this section, we focus on derivation of the optimal storage and hedging rules
under output and price risks. These rules allow us to better understand the
nature of futures prices in relation to price expectations and risk behavior. We
also show how these rules differ from those of previous studies derived under
more restrictive assumptions.
Futures  contracts  have been  considered primarily  as an  instrument  for
hedging against price risk. Their use, however, is not so limited. Futures are
used e'tensively as a speculative instrument. For a producer facing output and
price risks, short  hedging with futures  reduces price risk  but increases  exposure
to output risk because the firm has to deliver the quantity hedged out of its
stocks at the  contract's maturity  or buy out the contract at the prevailing
market  price.  Physical  stocks  reduce  exposure  to  output  risk  but  increase
exposure to price risk. Under futures trading, exposure to output risk can also
be reduced by long hedging, by which means the agent can essure delivery of the
commodity. However, a long futures position increases exposure to price risk
because the quantity hedged may have to be sold at a yet uncertain price.
What is the optimal level of  hedging for a  producer facing  both output and
price risks?  The problem is more complicated than the case of price risk only
because the agent should take a short position to hedge against the price risk
-23-and a  long position  to  hedge against the output risk.  There  is an  apparent
conflict. Furthermore, the agent can use physical stocks to hedge against the
output risk. Optimal hedging rules for futures under output and price risks have
been investigated by Rolfo (1980),  Newbery and Stiglitz (1981),  and  Anderson and
Danthine  (1983), using the CARA utility function. These papers  show that the
optimal hedge consists of a speculative component that depends linearly on the
futures price  bias  and  a hedging  component that depends  on  the correlation
between revenue and  price. Marcus and  Modest (1984)  derive a  multi-period optimal
production rule for risk-neutral agents under output and price risks and futures
trading. They find that the optimal production rule does not differ much from
that under price risk alone. This section  provides  explicit solutions for  optimal
futures and stock positions simultaneously, under both price and output risks.
A.  Optimal  Hedging  and  Storage
Without loss of generality, let us assume that futures contracts do not
require  margin deposits and  transactions costs  are zero.  Then, a futures contract
entered into in the current period does not affect current-period consumption.
Unlike physical stocks, it cannot be used to allocate consumption over time.
Any profit or  loss from futures trading materializes  in the next period  and
affects the next-period consumption by
6,  =  .6,  03.  +  8  IfI  +xI)  -PfX,  (25)
where  XI is the  futures position taken  in the current period,  for contracts
maturing in the next  period. The  agent is long on futures if X1>0, or short if
X1<0. Pf  is the futures price of the commodity.
The agent's optimization problem is to maximize .7  in (2)  with respect to
-24-iJS  . . dl| 
Il  and  Xi,  subject to (25)  and initial endowments. The  first  order conditions for
the maximum are
POUI(C)  P8EOPV/(C)
4  i  loo,  (26)
EoV, (el,) (Pi -P)  = O 
The second condition above should hold as an equality for all values of XI  and
non-negative values of Xi.
As  before, the  equivalent precautionary premium  can be defined  ar the
payment,  if,  in units of output that satisfy
[  I(QF+6 11-nf)  + (P-Pt)  Xl] =  EOP 1V'[P  +8Il)+(  P-P 2 )X 1 ],  (27)
where the superscript (f) denotes the case of futures trading. Again, using the
same steps as in (16),  nz  can be approximated by
f  - (2pCO6.+X16)  - 7  Al(  2+lo22  (28) Po*._  2  10  (28) 1
where  =  and  A1=Q1+611+X 1. To solve (26), it is necessary
to use an approximation of  P.  EOV'(4).  Let
Pf  V'7P 1 (Q 1 +8.r-a 2 )  +(P1 -P2 )Xj  = P2 EoV[LP(O1+8I)  +(li-P 2)Xl],  (29)
then
-25--rr  r  _ p  o  +  - (Po(a.v+  1  Y2(C  (30)
2  2  ~VI'  (C 1)
Now we can substitute  (27) through  (30) into  (26) to express the first
order  conditions  in terms  of  certainty equivalents.  We  again assume  a CRRA
utility function. The two first-order conditions can be combined to express Xi
in terms of IX
Xl  (AO-.T 1)  - (51.5I  )  - dPO  (31)
where  4.  Ty~2PJ[-  T~  J e  =(pa)  16_-2  PO  -1)  [(1O  PO)<
Equation  (31)  provides the optimal hedging rule, given XI.  It consists of
three  components.  The  first term  in  (31) is the  speculative component  that
depends, among other things, on the spread between the expected spot and futures
prices. The second term represents the pure hedging component that reflects the
agent's precautionary behavior against the price risk. The third term is what
Anderson and Danthine (1983)  called the hedging adjustment term (HAT)  to account
for the correlation between output and price risks.
In an unbiased  futures market, in the  sense that  P=,P 1 ,  the expected
capital gain from buying or selling a futures contract is zero.  Therefore, there
will be no speculative demand for futures.  In (31), the speculative component
is zero if and only if  P,=Pl  (note that  4=0  if  P,=P1 ).  This  result is in
agreement with that of  Anderson and Danthine (1983),  among others, derived under
the CARA  assumption.  In a biased  futures market,  the producer's  speculative
demand is positive or negative depending on whether the expected spot price is
higher or lower than the futures price.
-26-The  second and  third  terms  in  (31) reflect  the agent's  precautionary
behavior. If the futures market is unbiased and output risk does not exist, the
first and third terms in (31)  vanish and the producer's optimal futures position
will be short hedging the entire expected output plus  stocks carried over net of
stocking costs. Under output uncertainty,  however, the producer  should short
hedge more or less than  completely, depending on whether  HAT is positive or
negative.  The  presence  of  HAT  in  (31) is the  result  of  introducing  output
uncertainty and  the covariance  between output and  price risks, and  was recognized
earlier by Newbery and Stiglitz (1981),  Rolfo (1980), and Stiglitz (1983). The
sign of HAT depends on that of p. If the price and output risks are negatively
correlated and output falls below expectations, the producer will have to make
up  for  the  shortfall  by  buying  at  a  higher-than-expected  price.  Thus,  the
producer needs to take precautionary measures by hedging less than completely.
If the price and output risks are positively correlated and output falls short,
price will also fall below expectations. The producer will be able to close the
short futures position at a lower-than-expected price. Thus, the producer does
not need to take a precautionary measure; instead, it is better to short more
than completely in  order to take advantage of the opportunity for capital gains. 6
Using (31)  in (26)  yields an explicit solution for  II  in  terms of exogenous
variables and parameters. Since the first-order conditions involve two nonlinear
equations in  two unknowns, the solution  becomes very complicated. To simplify the
expressions, let
Then,
6  Anderson and Danthine noted that the presence of HAT alters some of the
earlier  results  concerning  producer behavior  under output  uncertainty.  They
showed that output uncertainty does not necessarily reduce the amount of hedging
by  producers  or  the  level  of  expected  out.  Further,  they  argued  that  the
availability of futures trading does not necessarily increase the planned output
of producers, in contrast to what Holthausen (1979)  and Feder, Just, and Schmitz
(1980) showed for a producer facing price risk. Our model, with  appropriate
extension, could corroborate the Anderson and Danthine proposition.
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d  =  a2_ wA(1+A).  ) (6.)2,
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B.  Speculative  Behavior  and  the  Theory  of  Normal  Backwardation
When both futures  contracts and  physical stocks  are available, an agent can
speculate with either or both. It is immaterial  which instrument is used as long
as the expected  returns are the  same. However,  since physical  stocks  incur
storage costs while futures contracts, by assumption, do not imply transactions
costs, there is little  reason for  agents to speculate  with stocks.  Normally, spot
and futures prices move closely together, thus allowing speculators to focus on
futures contracts as the main  speculative vehicle.  Indeed, the optimal stock
demand given by (32)  is insensitive to changes in  price expectations in relation
to spot  and futures prices, while the  demand  for futures in  (31) is highly
-28-sensitive. Figure 2 shows the optimal solutions for  stockholding and the futures
position for a hypothetical case, for a range of values for the futures price
bias, defined as  the expected spot  price minus the futures price. A negative bian
indicates contango, while a positive bias represents backwardation. It is shown
that as  the market shifts from contango  to backwardation, the agent moves rapidly
from a large short position to a  large long position. Stock demand, however,
remains relatively  stable.  The result  confirms the  conjecture  that futures
become the main speculative instrument when futures trading is available.
Figure 2 also plots the precautionary premium against futures price bias.
The premium  is large when the bias in absolute terms is large and reaches a
minimum  near  zero bias.  In fact, the precautionary  premium  would  have  been
exactly zero at the point of zero futures price bias (unbiased futures market),
had there not been output uncertainty. This is so  because the producer faces zero
risk  in  an unbiased  futures market  with output  certainty;  the producer  can
completely eliminate the price risk by using the futures price. It can be seen
that the effect of  HAT on the precautionary premium is  probably relatively small.
It can also be seen that the precautionary premium can be large when the futures
market is in substantial backwardation or contango, resulting in sizable futures
positions.
More formally, the precautionary demand model presented  in this section
implies a relationship between the precautionary premium and futures  price bias.
Equations  (31), (32), (27), (28), and (26) imply
f(  .P 1 -Pf  I Q 1 gAP 0 o,P,68,  X, 0iO)  *  0.  (33)
The implicit function (33) takes a  complicated form and it is not feasible to
show analytically the importance of the precautionary premium in explaining the
-29-Figure 2: Futures Demand and Precautionary  Premium
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futures price bias. However, judging from Figure 2, two features of (33) stand
out. First, the  precautionary premium could  vary considerably across  the spectrum
of  futures  price  bias.  Second,  most  of  the  variation  in  the  precautionary  premium
results  from  changes  in the futures  position.
When the  market  is in contango  and  the agent  is short  hedged,  the  amount
of  precautionary  premium  the  agent  is  willing  to  pay  increases  as  the  short  hedge
position  increases.  The increase  in  the  precautionary  premium  for  an additional
unit of short  hedge  position  may be called  the marginal  precautionary  premium
-30-(MPP)O Similarly, MPP  can be defined for the region of backwardation. Figure 3
plots the MPP implied by Figure 2. MPP is negative when the agent is in a short
hedge position, meaning that the precautionary premium  increases as the short
position increases. It is positive when the agent is long on futures. Note that
MPP is a nonlinear function of the futures price bias but falls below the 45
degree line. When the market is in contango, the agent needs to be paid MPP for
shorting an extra unit of futures, but the  market compensates him  by only as  much
as  P.-PF . In Figure  3, the latter is smaller than MPP in absolute terms for a
wide  range of futures price bias, meaning that the agent is  willing to go short
to a greater extent than the market compensates him for his risk taking. For a
significant range of backwardation, MPP is  smaller than  P1 -P2 ,  meaning that the
agent wants to be compensated by more than the precautionary premium to take up
a long position.
In all, a substantial part of futures price bias is accounted for by the
precautionary premium, although the proportion varies depending on the agent's
futures position. The producer will be a short hedger for a  wide range of futures
price  bias,  but  could become  a  long  hedger  if the  expected  spot  price  is
sufficiently higher than the futures price.
C.  Effects  of  Futures  Trading  on  Storage
First, we ask the question whether agents will hold more or less stocks,
speculative  and precautionary,  under  futures trading  than without  it. Prima
facie, it may be argued that since futures contracts offer costless means of
reducing the  price  risk, the producer  can reduce the  overall  level of risk
exposure under futures trading compared to the situation where futures trading
does not exist. The producer's precautionary premium under futures trading will
be smaller than without it. To simplify, suppose the futures  market is  unbiased,
then  *=O,  C=1, *=  1  , -=@=-&=4=  =-  I,  X-  Kp
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and  (32)  reduces  to
IS  8Ao- (1+28YO)  Q1-6Y*pO..ve  (34)
26  (1. 8 y")
where
-32-uf  =  (61+8AO)-6Y"po08d, 2 +28y*(1+8y')  (1+)  ae,
and the supercript (uf) denotes the case of an unbiased futures market.
First, let us compare  (34)  with  (10)  where there is  no price risk. The two
look strikingly similar in  that  the price risk factor appears only in  conjunction
with its correlation with the output risk and not as frequently as in (19).  This
result reflects the  (price) risk-reducing role of an unbiased futures market.
Comparing  (34)  with  (10), it  is immediately clear that  I1  >I1  if p<O and vice
versa. That  is, if p<O, the price increases when output  falls short and the
producer can  sell stocks  at a  higher-than-expected price. Therefore, the  producer
would want to hold more stocks than in the case of price certainty. Recall that
an unbiased futures market does not afford the producer complete elimination of
the price risk if the output risk is present. On the other hand, if p>O, stocks
will face lower-than-expected prices when output falls short, thus reducing the
incentive to hold stocks. Thus, the optimal response is to reduce stockholding
but increase the short futures position.
For  the more general  case when price  risk  is  present,  (32) should be
compared  with  (19). However,  the  relative  size  of  the  two  expressions  is
difficult to  ascertain  algebraically. Figure 4 depicts the differences in stock
demand for a range of price risks. It is  clear that the producer generally holds
more stocks under futures trading than without it. Also, the greater the price
risk, the more stocks the producer holds under futures  trading. There is  a minor
exception to this when the covariance is  highly positive. The reason for  this is
that the producer usually finds it desirable to short hedge expected output and
stocks to reduce the price risk and cover the increased exposure to the output
risk by increasing stockholding.
-33-Figure  4: Price  Risk and Storage  with Futures
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V  . Conlusions
This paper presents  a formulation  of the producer demand  for physical
stocks and futures as a  form of precautionary  behavior. This formulation
overcomes the  difficulties in  the  traditional explanation that  involves
speculative  demand  on  the  one  hand  and  convenience  yield  on  the  other.  The model
provides  simultaneous  solutions  for  optimal  stock  carryover  and  futures  positions
for  a producer  facing  output  and  price  risks.  As such,  it  could  be  useful  in
practical  applications,  including  developing  countries  that rely  on exporto  of
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When both output and price risks exist,  stocks reduce exposure to  the
output risk but increase exposure to the price risk. The resulting stock demand
equation explains  a combination of speculative and precautionary  demands  for
stocks, overcoming the shortcoming  of earlier models  that failed  to recognize the
simultaneous existence of output and price risks. Stock demand under output and
price risks could be larger or smaller than under output or price risk alone,
depending on the sign  of the correlation  between the two risks. The precautionary
premium also depends on this correlation and drives a wedge between current and
expected spot prices.
Futures  contracts  are a useful  hedging and  speculative  instrument  for
commodity producers and its  availability lowers the precautionary premium agents
are willing to pay.  In  an  unbiased futures market, commodity producers should
short hedge more or less than completely, depending on whether output and price
risks are positively or negatively correlated. Since producers usually should
short hedge, and this increases exposure to output risk,  it is necessary to
increase stockholding under futures trading.  The precautionary premium is non-
zero in  an unbiased futures  market. The demand for futures is  extremely sensitive
to futures price bias, but the demand for stocks is not. In a biased futures
market, the precautionary premium could  be large and  be the main component of the
bias.
The optimal hedging rule derived in  this paper could have useful practical
applications for developing countries heavily dependent on exports of primary
commodities.  It incorporates  improvements on earlier models  in at least two
areas. First, it assumes a sensible preference function that yields nonlinear
demand  functions for stocks and futures. Second, it solves stock-holding and
hedging decisions simultaneously. These  refinements lead  to  optimal hedging  rules
significantly  different  from those  in earlier  studies. For example,  Rolfo's
-35-(1980)  results  for  cocoa-producing  developing  countries  suggest  relatively  low
optimal  hedge  ratios  that  are  insensitive  to  output  and  stock  levele,  and  to  the
degree  of absolute  risk  aversion.  Increased  exposure  to output  risk  is  the  main
reason  cited  by  Rolfo  for  the  reluctance  of  these  countries  to hedge.  This  paper
suggests  that,  when  output  risk  can  be countered  by stockholding,  producers  will
be  more  willing  to  hedge.  The  fact  that  cocoa  producers  have  not  been  significant
users  of futures  trading  may be because  they normally  ship  out  entire  harvests
to industrial  countries  for  processing  and  therefore  are  not  adequately  prepared
to  deal  with  output  risk.  The  optimal  policy  for  these  countries  is  to keep  some
stocks  and  hedge  a substantial  portion  of their  expected  output  and stocks.
The  model  presented  here  requires  further  investigation  and  extension.  It
awaits  practical  application  to real  world  situations.  Generalization  to  multi-
period  stochastic  optimization  is  an obvious  extension.
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